Nvidia representatives privately told Illinois representative Bill Foster that the company could implement measures to track advanced chips. That account adds a new dimension to a public debate over whether such safeguards are feasible and whether they could help prevent chips from being smuggled to China.
Private assurances meet public objections
Foster, a Democrat on the Committee on Science, Space, and Technology, is a cosponsor of the Chip Security Act. He told MIT Technology Review that Nvidia representatives said the proposed measures were technically possible during discussions with him. Foster said they did not put that assurance in writing.
The private response contrasts with the position of the Semiconductor Industry Association, of which Nvidia is a member. In March 2026, the association opposed the bill, describing its tracking requirements as “new, untested, and potentially infeasible.” Nvidia has not publicly confirmed Foster’s account, and the company did not respond to requests for comment or confirmation.
The act was introduced in May 2025. At the time, lawmakers said the technology needed to implement it already existed, but Nvidia had not publicly said it could meet the proposed requirements. The bill is one of three chip-security measures under consideration for inclusion in the Senate’s National Defense Authorization Act.
What the proposed tracking could do
As drafted, the Chip Security Act would require a way to establish where chips are. The options include inspections of facilities, company attestations, or a mechanism that checks location through a signal from the chip.
The ping-based approach would require a GPU to send a signal about its location when it comes online. The source describes it as the hardest option to circumvent. In September, the Center for Security and Emerging Technology found it would be the most cost-effective option.
Nvidia has already announced a tool that can help customers monitor chips across data centers. In December 2025, it introduced Fleet Intelligence to track how its advanced chips perform at different locations. Nvidia confirmed to Reuters that the tool could indicate which country chips were in, but did not explain whether it could be used to stop smuggling.
That capability points to a distinction between observing a chip’s location and controlling what happens next. Foster said the bill’s tracking requirements would tell investigators where chips are, but would not let them disconnect chips found to have been smuggled.
Why the debate has sharpened
The legislation is receiving renewed attention amid allegations of chip smuggling and reported events involving Nvidia CEO Jensen Huang. The source reports that Alice Huang, with whom Jensen Huang reportedly had an affair, runs Megaspeed, a Singaporean firm under investigation for smuggling advanced GPUs to China.
Megaspeed reportedly bought chips from Supermicro, which packages Nvidia chips onto servers. A US Commerce Department inquiry into Megaspeed was reportedly halted after intervention by Nvidia. These are reported allegations and developments, while the legislation itself remains under consideration.
In early October, when lawmakers were reportedly increasingly concerned about Nvidia’s role in smuggling, MIT Technology Review asked whether Fleet Intelligence could be used to prevent it. Nvidia did not answer directly. Its statement said: “Governments and media have found insignificant diversion of controlled US products—a drop in the bucket compared to the ocean of domestic compute China already has.”
Tracking versus operating permission
Foster said he did not ask Nvidia’s representatives why the company was not adopting chip-tracking tools voluntarily if they were technically possible. His next proposal would go further than location checks. He intends to introduce stricter legislation in the new year that would require licenses to operate advanced GPUs.
Under that proposed approach, a GPU would need a valid license verified before it could connect. The idea addresses a gap Foster sees in the Chip Security Act: knowing where a chip is does not itself prevent its use. The two approaches would therefore address different steps—location verification and permission to operate.
Foster said the controversy at Nvidia had increased support among his colleagues for the bill’s geographic validation requirements. He expects political pressure on companies to do a good job verifying where chips are. Whether those requirements become part of the Senate’s National Defense Authorization Act, and what form they take, remains central to the debate over chip security.